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Thursday, September 30, 2021

Do climate dynamics matter for economics? - Nature.com

Economic models of climate change are the basis for climate policy design. However, incorrect representation of physical dynamics in these models could lead to biased advice.

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Fig. 1: The uncertainty about the social cost of carbon.

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How a housing downturn could wreck China's growth model - The Economist

ADD “MALICIOUS price-cutting” to the growing lexicon of Xi Jinping’s China. The phrase has cropped up in the past but is being increasingly used by provincial authorities to decry property developers’ attempts to slash home prices. Some developers, desperate to bring in revenue, are offering discounts of as much as 30%. Officials, fearing that the price cuts might frustrate recent homebuyers and lead to protests and distortions in the property market, regard the discounts as undermining social stability and have banned them. In the central city of Yueyang the government has told developers to stop increasing prices but also to refrain from reducing them by more than 15%.

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In such cases both regulators and developers are walking a tightrope, teetering between sky-high prices and a damaging downturn. The property market is probably the single largest driver of the country’s economy. Urban Chinese have flocked to it as a haven. House prices have soared over the past 15 years, often by more than 10% a year in large cities. Yet developers have borrowed huge amounts in the process. The industry’s total debt is about 18.4trn yuan ($2.8trn, equivalent to 18% of GDP), according to Morgan Stanley, a bank. Housing costs, relative to incomes, now make large Chinese cities some of the least affordable places in the world.

These trends have collided with officials’ goals of reducing corporate indebtedness and inequality, which lie at the heart of Mr Xi’s mission to bring “common prosperity” to China. The campaign has already brought down several large real-estate companies as regulators have tightened their access to credit. The latest is Evergrande, a developer with about $300bn in liabilities that has started to miss payments on dollar bonds. (As The Economist went to press Evergrande seemed to have missed another offshore-bond payment, due on September 29th.) The fear for officials is not just that the unwinding of the group will unleash systemic financial risks. If the property sector were to tip into a correction, everything from local-government and household finances to the country’s growth model would be imperilled.

China’s leaders have cheered on the property boom for the best part of 30 years. When the central government overhauled the tax system in 1994, local authorities lost a large chunk of revenue. At the same time, local governments were prevented from issuing debt. Yet they were tasked with hitting high economic-growth targets, sometimes exceeding 10% a year. Selling land became one of the few things municipal officials could do to generate revenues, which would in turn finance roads and other public works. They could also set up companies that could borrow from banks and raise debt from other sources. This arrangement meant economic growth was tightly bound to booming property.

Between 1999 and 2007 the quantity of rural land transferred to urban use increased by an average annual rate of almost 23%, and public-land sales soared by an average of 31% a year. Soon the property market became the prime lever for controlling economic growth. During the global financial crisis much of China’s $586bn stimulus package came in the form of loans and shadow-banking funds for developers. “The property market was a vehicle for delivering the stimulus,” says Kevin Lai of Daiwa Capital Markets, a broker. By 2010 land sales accounted for more than 70% of municipal incomes a year, although the rate varied between regions.

The failure to break away from this setup is one of China’s biggest economic blunders of recent decades. The relationship between the property market and overall growth remains as strong as ever. Residential investment alone makes up 15% of GDP; the economic importance of property rises to 29% once construction and other related industries are added in, according to an estimate by Kenneth Rogoff of Harvard University and Yuanchen Yang of Tsinghua University. As a result, homebuyers and developers alike have considered the housing market too important to fail, finds Hanming Fang of the University of Pennsylvania. They have treated their investments as one-way bets.

The Evergrande crisis and some property indicators are beginning to threaten that long-held belief. Malicious price-cutting may be in the headlines, but only especially cash-strapped developers have resorted to it. Yet demand is weakening from its high base. One gauge is growth in prices, which has slowed in recent months. Another is the secondary market, where speculative investors cash out. In Shenzhen, a southern boomtown, transactions fell for four consecutive months to 2,423 in August, compared with a monthly average of 8,376 in 2020, according to Rhodium Group, a consultancy.

The easy stream of credit that kept construction sites buzzing is drying up. Access to bank and shadow-bank loans, as well as demand for on- and offshore bonds, is weakening for the industry in general, says Cedric Lai of Moody’s, a rating agency. Net offshore dollar-bond issuance has turned negative for developers for the first time in at least a decade (see chart 1). Land sales for residential projects declined in the first half of the year, mainly because of government limits on bank exposures to developers. S&P, another rating agency, has downgraded many developers to junk. Moody’s says its outlook on China’s property sector is now negative.

Such news has grabbed the attention of local officials. Declining demand for homes and a shortage of funds will mean less demand for land. The development of a municipal-bond market over the past decade has helped some regions move away from land sales. But on the whole local officials have only become more addicted. Total government sales revenue has climbed since 2015 and reached about 8.3% of GDP in 2020 (see chart 2). Any decrease bodes ill for the economies of smaller cities.

Households, meanwhile, are on some measures more exposed to property than ever. In 2019 housing represented about 60% of their total assets (financial assets accounted for just 20%). This overreliance has driven up mortgage debt to about 76% of total household liabilities. As developers lost other forms of funding over the past five years they became heavily reliant on pre-sales income, where buyers pay for their homes, sometimes in full, months or years before completion. Between 2015 and July 2021 the share of pre-sale revenue as a source of funding for developers rose from 39% to 54%, according to Natixis, a French bank. Some of the people who paid in advance for Evergrande homes or bought one of the company’s wealth-management products have protested outside its offices.

Investors are now waiting for government action. Some expect that, as the economic outlook darkens, officials will ease monetary conditions. Most banks have used up government quotas for property-sector loans this year, says Zhang Zhiwei of Pinpoint Asset Management, a hedge fund based in Shanghai. The quotas will be renewed in January, leading to a burst in lending, he says. Raymond Yeung of ANZ, a bank, thinks that regulators are well enough informed of the risks that few other developers will encounter the same problems as Evergrande. A property slowdown might knock a half of a percentage point off GDP growth this year, he says. Mo Ji of Fidelity International, an asset manager, says she expects the turbulence to take a percentage point off growth.

The short-term outlook, however, might ignore a bigger secular shift. Mr Lai of Daiwa says the market is “very close to the end of the housing boom”, because the accumulation in debt cannot continue. Efforts to make China more equal could mean more moderate price rises in future, says Oxford Economics, a consultancy. Whether China’s unfavourable demographics can continue to support a market of this size over the next decade is an open question, reckons Mr Yeung.

Few options for decoupling economic growth from housing exist. China should have focused more of its construction on megacities, which tend to have diverse sources of funding and competent administrators, says Andy Xie, an economist. Instead local officials in small towns have squandered land revenues, often spending on vanity projects even as young workers leave for large cities. For the economy to end its unhealthy dependence on property development, it may be necessary for many local governments to cease to exist.

For more expert analysis of the biggest stories in economics, business and markets, sign up to Money Talks, our weekly newsletter.

An early version of this article was published online on September 29th 2021

This article appeared in the Finance & economics section of the print edition under the headline "The property complex"

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How a housing downturn could wreck China's growth model - The Economist
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The Geopolitical Conquest of Economics by Jean Pisani-Ferry - Project Syndicate

PARIS – From the Huawei affair to the AUKUS spat and beyond, a new reality is shaking up the global economy: the takeover, usually hostile, of international economics by geopolitics. This process is probably only just beginning, and the challenge now is learning how to live with it.

Of course, economics and geopolitics have never been completely separate domains. The post-World War II liberal economic order was designed by economists, but on the basis of a master plan conceived by foreign-policy strategists. Postwar US policymakers knew what they wanted: what a 1950 National Security Council report called a “world environment in which the American system can survive and flourish.” From their perspective, the free world’s prosperity was the (ultimately successful) conduit to containing and possibly defeating Soviet communism, and the liberal order was the conduit to that prosperity.

But although the ultimate objective was geopolitical, international economic relations were shaped for 70 years by their own rules. On occasion, concrete decisions were skewed by geopolitics: for the United States, providing International Monetary Fund financial assistance to Mexico was never equivalent to providing it to Indonesia. The principles governing trade or exchange-rate policy, however, were strictly economic.

The end of the Cold War temporarily put economists on top. For three decades afterward, finance ministers and central bankers thought they were running the world. As Jake Sullivan (now the national security adviser to US President Joe Biden) and Jennifer Harris pointed out in 2020, management of globalization had been deferred to “a small community of experts.” Again, there was an underlying geopolitical aim: in the same way that economic openness had contributed to the Soviet Union’s collapse, it was expected to bring about China’s convergence toward the Western model. But for the rest, interference remained limited.

The rise of China and its growing rivalry with the US brought this era to an end. With the failure of convergence through economic integration, geopolitics has returned to the fore. Biden’s focus on the Chinese challenge and his decision not to dismantle the trade restrictions put in place by his predecessor, Donald Trump, confirm that the US has entered a new era in which foreign policy has taken over from economics.

In China, there was no need for such a takeover. Although the country’s leaders routinely pay lip service to multilateralism, both its historical tradition and governance philosophy emphasize political control of domestic and especially foreign economic relations. The transnational Belt and Road Initiative embodies this model: as Georgetown University’s Anna Gelpern and co-authors recently documented, Chinese loan contracts to finance infrastructure projects in developing countries are opaque, involve political conditionality, and explicitly rule out debt restructuring through multilateral procedures.

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Even in Europe, where belief in the primacy of economics was most entrenched, things have begun to change. “The beating heart of the globalist project is in Brussels,” US populist agitateur Steve Bannon declared contemptuously in 2018. This was in fact true: the primacy of common rules over state discretion is part of Europe’s DNA. But the European Union, too, is now waking up to the new reality. Already in 2019, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen spoke of leading a “geopolitical commission.”

The question is what this renewed geopolitical focus actually implies. Most foreign-policy experts envision international relations as a power game. Their implicit models often assume that one country’s gain is another’s loss. Economists, on the other hand, are more interested in promoting the gains that cross-border transactions or joint action yield to all parties. Their benchmark concept of international economic relations envisions independent actors voluntarily entering into mutually beneficial arrangements.

In a 2019 article, Sullivan and Kurt Campbell (who now directs Asia policy at Biden’s National Security Council) outlined a plan for “competition without catastrophe” between the US and China. Their scheme combined across-the-board trade reciprocity with China, the formation of a club of deeply integrated market democracies (access to which would be conditional on economic alignment), and a policy sequencing in which competition with China would be the default option, with cooperation conditional on China’s good behavior. They also rejected any linkage between US concessions and cooperation in the management of global commons such as climate.

This would be a clear strategy, but the Biden administration has not yet indicated whether it intends to pursue it. US middle-class economic woes and the resulting enduring domestic reluctance to open up trade contradict geopolitical aims and make America’s intentions hard to read. Foreign-policy types may have prevailed over economists, but domestic politics reigns supreme, and clear-mindedness is not what is guiding action.

China, meanwhile, has flatly refused to carve out climate cooperation from the wider US-Chinese discussion, and recently wrong-footed the US by applying to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, a regional trade pact that President Barack Obama designed to isolate China but that Trump chose to quit. Instead of being isolated, China is trying to outmaneuver the US.

Paradoxically, Europe is getting closer to defining its stance. It still believes in global rules, and gives priority to persuading partners to negotiate and enforce them, but it stands ready to act on its own. “Open strategic autonomy” – its new buzzword – seemed to be an oxymoron. But the EU now seems to know what it means: in the words of senior EU trade official Sabine Weyand, “work with others wherever we can, and work autonomously wherever we must.” In a more geopolitical world, this may well become Europe’s credo.

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The Geopolitical Conquest of Economics by Jean Pisani-Ferry - Project Syndicate
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'Connect with Distinguished Ohio Economics Alumni' kicks off with Rosewood COO John Purcell on Oct. 6 - Ohio University

The Economics Department will start a new speaker series called “Connect with Distinguished Ohio Economics Alumni” with a webinar featuring John Purcell on Wednesday, Oct. 6, at 7 p.m.

Students must register online for this webinar.

“We want our students to be able to connect with OHIO alumni who are making an impact in the world,” said Dr. Julia Paxton, professor and Economics Department undergraduate chair.

Purcell is chief operating officer of Rosewood Capital Management, which is breaking into the music patent industry. After earning both a B.A. and an M.A. in economics, he worked for a number of firms analyzing financial markets.

During the webinar, Purcell will discuss how an economics degree has helped shape his career and offer career advice for students interested in studying economics.

“These engaging sessions with students and alumni are a great opportunity to help our students network with industry leaders,” said Dr. Florenz Plassmann, dean of the College of Arts and Sciences. “The department plans to host a diverse range of alumni who used their economics degrees to launch successful careers in a wide range of fields.”

Purcell has 30 years of financial markets experience in fixed income capital markets, trading and asset management. He spent the majority of his sell-side career with Salomon Brothers and the successor companies including Citigroup, becoming global head of Fixed Income Syndicate and North American Capital Markets, responsible for all fixed income syndicate functions including capital commitment and risk management for investment grade, high yield, emerging markets, asset-backed securities, structured products, and private placements.

Purcell also spent seven years with King Street Capital Management as co-head of Capital Markets and Investor Relations. He has extensive firsthand knowledge of the entire life cycle of debt, from its creation to its role in portfolio construction for end investors. He has had significant direct experience with the key participants involved in these various stages, including issuers, underwriters, investors and consultants. Through this experience, he has a developed a clear understanding of the needs and modus operandi of the key decision makers at each level and stage. He also has considerable experience restructuring, building and managing teams in the financial sector.

The OHIO community is invited to connect with John Purcell on LinkedIn.

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'Connect with Distinguished Ohio Economics Alumni' kicks off with Rosewood COO John Purcell on Oct. 6 - Ohio University
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Wednesday, September 29, 2021

How to watch: 'Home Economics' season 2 premieres Wednesday on ABC starring Topher Grace, Jimmy Tatro - WLS-TV

CHICAGO -- "Home Economics" season two premiere kicks off on ABC Wednesday night.

It's a family comedy about three siblings with very different lifestyles and tax brackets. Tom Hayworth's the oldest, a struggling author. Sarah is a child counselor in a same sex marriage and cash challenged. Connor is a financial whiz and he's got money to burn!


"He (Connor) wants everyone to enjoy the stuff he's earned in his life," said Topher Grace, who plays Tom and serves as executive producer on the series. "The only problem is his older brother wishes that he'd earned it, there's a friction there, but it's only in Tom's head, really.

As the first season aired, people seem to really connect with the diverse family.


"There's a character in the show for everyone," said Jimmy Tatro, who plays Connor. "Since we do kind of cover every part of the spectrum for income, there's a character everyone can kind of relate to. I think a lot of families just don't really talk about these things, so to have a show where we can have these conversations, make them funny and also have those uncomfortable conversations a lot of families are too scared to have, so if you don't want to have them, just say 'hey, watch episode three.'"

"Ultimately the show is about the love these people have with each other - so much more important than money," Grace added.

You can watch the season 2 premiere of "Home Economics" on ABC Wednesday at 9:30 ET | 8:30 CT.

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Outdoor Economics Conference and Expo puts Farmington in spotlight - Farmington Daily Times

Biden Presses Democrats to Embrace His Economic Agenda - The New York Times

The president canceled a trip to Chicago in an attempt to salvage a pair of bills containing trillions of dollars in spending on infrastructure, education, climate change and more.

WASHINGTON — President Biden and his aides mounted an all-out effort on Wednesday to salvage Mr. Biden’s economic agenda in Congress, attempting to forge even the beginnings of a compromise between moderates and progressives on a pair of bills that would spend trillions to rebuild infrastructure, expand access to education, fight climate change and more.

Mr. Biden canceled a scheduled trip to Chicago, where he was planning to promote Covid-19 vaccinations, in order to continue talking with lawmakers during a critical week of deadlines in the House. One crucial holdout vote in the Senate, Kyrsten Sinema, a centrist from Arizona, was set to visit the White House on Wednesday morning, a person familiar with the meeting said.

Ms. Sinema was one of the Democratic champions of a bipartisan bill, brokered by Mr. Biden, to spend more than $1 trillion over the next several years on physical infrastructure like water pipes, roads, bridges, electric vehicle charging stations and broadband internet. That bill passed the Senate this summer. It is set for a vote this week in the House. But progressive Democrats have threatened to block it unless it is coupled with a more expansive bill that contains much of the rest of Mr. Biden’s domestic agenda, like universal prekindergarten and free community college, a host of efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and tax breaks for workers and families that are meant to fight poverty and boost labor force participation.

Ms. Sinema and another centrist in the Senate, Joe Manchin III of West Virginia, have expressed reservations over the scope of that larger bill and balked at the $3.5 trillion price tag that Democratic leaders have attached to it. Moderates in the House and Senate, led by Ms. Sinema, have resisted many of the tax increases on high earners and corporations that Mr. Biden proposed to offset the spending and tax cuts in the bill, in order to avoid adding further to the budget deficit.

Mr. Biden has thus far failed to convince Ms. Sinema and Mr. Manchin to agree publicly to a framework for how much they are willing to spend and what taxes they are willing to raise to fund the more expansive bill. If Mr. Biden cannot find a way to address their concerns, while also assuaging progressives and persuading them to support his infrastructure bill, he could see the warring factions in his party kill his entire economic agenda in the span of a few days.

Some Democrats have complained this week that the president has not engaged in talks to their satisfaction, though he has cleared his schedule this week in hopes of brokering a deal. He welcomed groups of progressives and moderates to the White House last week, for example, but met with each separately, as opposed to a group negotiation session.

Both Ms. Sinema and Mr. Manchin visited the White House on Tuesday, but after their meetings, neither they nor White House officials would enumerate the contours of a bill they could support.

“The president felt it was constructive, felt they moved the ball forward, felt there was an agreement, that we’re at a pivotal moment,” Jen Psaki, the White House press secretary, told reporters on Tuesday, characterizing the meetings. “It’s important to continue to finalize the path forward to get the job done for the American people.”

White House officials said late Tuesday that Mr. Biden remained in frequent contact with a wide range of Democrats, including phone calls with progressives, and that he would have more conversations on Wednesday.

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Biden Presses Democrats to Embrace His Economic Agenda - The New York Times
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Major alternatives to economics | Opinions - The Mass Media

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Major alternatives to economics | Opinions  The Mass Media
Major alternatives to economics | Opinions - The Mass Media
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Democrats Are Denying Basic Economics – Reason.com - Reason

The simplest way to understand economics is that it is a reckoning with unavoidable tradeoffs. If you spend money on something, you may obtain something in return—but you lose the ability to use those resources on something else. In the world of politics, economics helps us weigh the merits of those tradeoffs. It answers the question: Do the benefits of a policy outweigh the costs? Sometimes the benefits are larger. Sometimes they are meager or even nonexistent. But there are always costs. To acknowledge this is merely to acknowledge reality. 

Under President Joe Biden, however, Democrats in Washington have decided that they can simply wish those tradeoffs away by declaring that they do not exist. Over and over again, they have argued that their policies do not or should not have any costs whatsoever. 

Just this week, for example, White House press secretary Jen Psaki responded to a question about the tax impact of the $3.5 trillion spending plan now working its way through Congress by declaring that "there are some…who argue that in the past companies have passed on these costs to consumers…we feel that that's unfair and absurd and the American people would not stand for that."  

When taxes are raised on corporations—the "companies" in Psaki's response—corporations often respond by passing that tax on to others. In some cases, they pass costs to consumers. In others, as the Cato Institute's Scott Lincicome wryly notes on Twitter, they reduce the amount they would have otherwise spent on wages. They have to pay more to do business, and so they make adjustments accordingly. Costs create consequences and tradeoffs. 

Empirical research has consistently shown that a large portion of corporate tax increases is actually paid by labor down the line. There are some reasonable academic debates about the precise percentage of the tax paid by labor, and how that might change under certain circumstances. But there is little real debate about whether or not some of the costs are passed on. The point is that it happens. Workers, not owners, pay at least some share of higher corporate taxes. 

Yet Psaki's position—the Biden White House's position—is that this sort of thing is "absurd and unfair." 

One may feel that the omnipresence of gravity is unfair and absurd. Nevertheless, few people plan their lives around the ability to leap into the air and fly whenever they would like. We accept reality and make plans around its constraints, however absurd or unfair they may seem. To do otherwise would be foolish. 

Yet that is essentially what Democrats are doing as they work to pass the Biden agenda. They are insisting that their plans, which are still in flux but amount to a call for some $4 trillion in spending over two bills, have no real costs at all—or that the costs should not be factored in, because they are "unfair and absurd." 

Just last week, Biden himself tweeted that the $3.5 trillion spending bill would not actually cost $3.5 trillion. Instead, its true price was more like nothing at all. "We talk about price tags. It is zero price tag on the debt," Biden said from a White House podium. "We are going to pay for everything we spend."

Biden's remarks came after a week in which congressional Democrats had run into something of an impasse over their spending plans. In response, they decided that the problem was not with the plans themselves, but with the messaging. Early messaging for the bigger of the bills, which is mostly focused on welfare state expansions and climate policy, had revolved around the $3.5 trillion figure, which Democrats had taken to as a sign of how much they wanted to commit to their agenda. But the size of the spending package became a point of contention with moderates, who worried, understandably, that $3.5 trillion was a lot of money—probably too much. 

Some Democrats admitted that the final legislation would likely end up trimmed down. But some backers of the spending bill, like Sen. Bernie Sanders (I–Vt.) have continued to insist that there is nothing that could reasonably be cut. After all, the $3.5 trillion figure was itself a compromise from their initial $6 trillion ask

So Democrats and their backers in the press focused most of their energy on altering the way they described the legislation. 

Hence we were treated to essays attempting to downplay the cost with headlines like: "$3.5 Trillion Is Not a Lot of Money" (New York magazine) and "It's Not Really a '$3.5 Trillion' Bill" (The New York Times). And then, of course, there were the official statements from Biden and White House communications functionaries making claims like "it's just a fact" that the plan "adds $0 to the debt."

It is not "just a fact." It is, at best, a dicey projection. And as Reason's Eric Boehm has noted, it may not even be that, partly because the legislation in its current form is structured via timing gimmicks intended to induce further spending down the road or begin spending late in order to hide the long-term, on-paper cost of the plans. 

But in some ways, this is all beside the point. It is a plan that, in its broadest form, calls for spending $3.5 trillion. Even in the unlikely event that such a plan turns out to be truly fully paid for, it would still spend $3.5 trillion. Those economic resources would be used to do some specific things, which in turn would reduce the ability to do other things. In other words, there would be costs and tradeoffs. 

Changing the description is just a way of wishing away those costs, of thinking that it is possible to make them disappear by saying that they aren't real or shouldn't matter. Under Biden, this has been the way for Democrats, especially the self-identified progressives, who have implied that large minimum wage hikes might not cost jobs (they would) and that debt and deficit-driven federal spending constraints are effectively not real (they are). The intent in every case is to downplay concerns that any significant tradeoffs actually exist. After all, costs and tradeoffs are absurd and unfair. Perhaps. But they are also real. And lawmakers ignore them at our peril. 

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Democrats Are Denying Basic Economics – Reason.com - Reason
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Antitrust Division Economics Director of Enforcement Jeffrey Wilder at the IAM and GCR Connect SEP Summit - Department of Justice

Leveling the Playing Field in the Standards Ecosystem: Principles for A Balanced Antitrust Enforcement Approach to Standards-Essential Patents

Remarks as Prepared 

Thank you for inviting me to speak today, and my thanks to IAM and Global Competition Review for hosting this Summit on Standards Essential Patents. I want to take this opportunity to share my perspective on the role of antitrust in the development, implementation, and licensing of standards and standards-essential patents (SEPs).

In recent months, I have been asked whether the Antitrust Division will chart a balanced course at the intersection of antitrust and intellectual property. The answer is yes. Our analysis of intellectual property aims to appropriately reflect the competing policy considerations, the realities of innovation in the modern economy, and the law. It also generally aligns with the views of the Federal Trade Commission, and we have been working intensely to ensure collaboration and communications between the intellectual-property experts on the staff of each agency. Understanding the importance of transparency to the business community and the bar, I would like to begin to preview today some of the Antitrust Division’s current positions in this area.

Industry-wide standards promote competition in a number of ways. Before a standard is adopted, competition to be the standard can drive innovation. Perhaps the most famous example of this is the so-called “War of the Currents” between Thomas Edison, George Westinghouse, and Nikola Tesla.[1] Their rivalry paved the way for the modern world. As Tesla predicted, the alternating current would make it “possible . . . for a businessman in New York . . . to call . . . and talk with any telephone subscriber in the world” using “an inexpensive instrument no bigger than a watch, which will enable its bearer to hear anywhere on sea or land for distances of thousands of miles.”[2] That was in 1909. Fast forward a century—competition between standards continues to drive innovation across a vast array of industries, from cellular communications to emerging applications in the Internet of Things.

Once a standard is adopted, it can promote interoperability, reduce switching costs, and expand consumer choice. A world where every device needs to be compatible with dozens of different power outlets or networks is inefficient, expensive, and frustrating. Standards “make products less costly for firms to produce and more valuable to consumers.”[3] They can also give rise to new products. For example, many communications technologies—including the audio and video codecs that make today’s virtual conference possible—would not exist without standards. Standardization can even foster dynamic competition by providing a forum for our most talented engineers to select the most promising new technologies over those that simply happen to be in the hands of a dominant incumbent.

It is therefore vital that the United States supports the standards ecosystem.[4] Standards development organizations (SDOs) use a variety of safeguards to achieve the benefits of standardization while minimizing potential antitrust risks. These safeguards include, as articulated in guidance circulated by OMB, taking steps to ensure that the standards-development process is “open to interested parties,” balanced, and consensus based, and that SDOs’ procedures provide for due process and appeals.[5] When this ecosystem works well, competition in standardized products thrives and consumers benefit. When it does not, we can miss out on standards that might make us safer, healthier, or more connected.

SEPs are an important part of the standards ecosystem. SDOs recognize the value of having patented technologies incorporated into their standards and encourage participation by patent owners. Fierce competition often ensues. Many SDOs have adopted intellectual property rights (IPR) policies that allow for royalties if a patent is incorporated into a standard. To be sure, patent holders benefit when their technologies are chosen. They gain access to a potentially large market for their SEPs—and with this new market, the possibility of substantial royalties. At the same time, many SDOs require the timely disclosure of patent rights and a commitment to license on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (or FRAND) terms. Through a FRAND licensing commitment, SEP holders forgo the ability to exercise any market power gained from standardization. Consequently, this commitment assures standards implementers that they will have access to SEPs on reasonable terms after a technology is standardized. While SDO IPR policies should facilitate efficient licensing, there are often disputes and unsavory negotiation tactics that make reaching a licensing agreement difficult. In these circumstances, standardized products can be delayed and consumers suffer.

The Antitrust Division has taken several steps in recent years aimed at encouraging standards development and good-faith SEP licensing. We have issued business review letters to SDOs and patent pools. We have released guidelines on the appropriate remedies for infringing SEPs subject to FRAND commitments and IP licensing generally. We have filed amicus briefs and statements of interest in district and appellate courts. We have engaged in competition advocacy with SDOs and their accrediting organization ANSI. Many of these steps helped make standards development and SEP licensing more competitive and efficient. Others arguably did not.

The reason that some of these initiatives worked while others failed is that the relationship between standards development, patents, and antitrust is complex. Care must be taken to strike the right balance. Antitrust encourages competition among technologies, products, and services, while standards development requires some degree of cooperation among market participants to agree on what form a standard will take. Patents confer a limited right to exclude, yet SEP holders often agree to share their technologies in order to be included in a standard and ultimately to benefit from its widespread adoption.

The challenge for antitrust enforcers is to balance these competing considerations. There is a healthy debate about how to do that. For example, President Biden’s July 9 Executive Order on Promoting Competition in the American Economy, calls for the “the Attorney General and the Secretary of Commerce . . . to consider whether to revise their position on the intersection of the intellectual property and antitrust laws, including by considering whether to revise the Policy Statement on Remedies for Standards-Essential Patents Subject to Voluntary F/RAND Commitments.”[6] The Antitrust Division has begun this important work. In such a dynamic area—standards and technology—it is critical for the government to constantly reevaluate whether its policies promote competition.

Today, I would like to explain what the Antitrust Division is doing, and will be doing, to support the standards ecosystem. First, the Antitrust Division will open investigations and bring enforcement actions when anticompetitive conduct—by SEP holders or any other participants in the standards development process—harms competition. That does not mean that every licensing dispute invites an antitrust challenge. Antitrust claims are not a panacea for failed bilateral negotiation. But antitrust can and should play a role when the standards-setting process is used to thwart competition and harm consumers. Second, the Antitrust Division will promote government policies that encourage good-faith licensing negotiation. That includes providing clearer guidance on what good-faith negotiation looks like and how bad-faith conduct can hinder competition. Third, the Antitrust Division will support (and not discourage) SDOs in their efforts to adopt IPR policies that address licensing inefficiencies and enable the dissemination of standardized products to consumers. Finally, the Antitrust Division will strive to be transparent about our enforcement priorities and policy changes to ensure that firms participating in the standards ecosystem understand what conduct can run afoul of the antitrust laws.

Protecting Competition During the STandards-Setting Process

Let’s start with SEPs and FRAND commitments. Standards are a critical part of our lives. They affect how our food is produced and packaged, how our homes are built, and the development of technology we depend on now more than ever. The development of standards offers significant benefits to consumers. It can also raise antitrust concerns. As the Supreme Court recognized in Allied Tube, when competing firms agree on a certain standard, they are implicitly agreeing “not to manufacture, distribute, or purchase certain types of products.”[7] For example, firms could hijack the standard-setting process to exclude competing technologies from consideration – not on the basis of merit, but simply because it furthers their commercial interests. Or firms could adopt standards with the express intent of excluding rivals from another market in which they compete. Another risk is hold up, whereby an SEP holder can demand royalties in excess of those that would have been negotiated before the standard was set because the licensee has sunk significant costs into bringing a product to market that relies on that standard.[8]

As I mentioned, many SDOs encourage or require firms to declare whether they own patents covering technology that might be incorporated into a standard and, if so, to commit to license those patents on FRAND terms. Such disclosures and commitments can promote access, facilitate licensing, and ultimately reduce SEP holders’ ability to hold up licensees and associated antitrust concerns.

In recent years, the Antitrust Division has argued that a patent owner’s breach of a FRAND commitment can never constitute an antitrust violation.[9] Indeed, some of the Division’s advocacy suggested that the antitrust laws are inapplicable to disputes involving SEPs and FRAND commitments.

But let’s step back for a moment to consider the context in which these disputes arise. We have market participants, many of which are direct horizontal competitors, getting together to choose a single technology to be incorporated into a standard. Whether that collective action confers market or monopoly power is an empirical question. The answer relies on an assessment of the competitive landscape surrounding the standard. What alternatives were available to the chosen technology? Could the standard exist but for the chosen technology? What other market solutions might have arisen if fundamental disagreements over the FRAND rate for a technology were known before it was incorporated into the standard? And that’s just a sampling.

This collective action among horizontal competitors, with the potential to generate procompetitive benefits as well as the potential to confer market or even monopoly power, opens the door for antitrust scrutiny. Courts by and large agree.[10] In Broadcom, the Third Circuit held that “a patent holder’s intentionally false promise [to an SDO] to license . . . on FRAND terms . . . coupled with an SDO’s reliance on that promise when including the technology in a standard [and] . . . subsequent breach of that promise, is actionable anticompetitive conduct.”[11] Such antitrust liability helps safeguard competition “[d]uring the critical competitive period that precedes adoption of a standard” where deception might “confer an unfair advantage” or “bias the competitive process in favor of . . . [a] technology’s inclusion in [a] standard.”[12] The D.C. Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Rambus.[13] There, it emphasized that an SEP holder’s distortion of the competitive process for developing a standard can trigger antitrust scrutiny. Thus, a plaintiff could establish an antitrust violation by showing that an SEP holder used deception and lured an SDO away from adopting an alternative technology. An SEP holder, by contrast, might show “that no suitable alternative technology was realistically available.”[14]

Broadcom and Rambus strike a balance between the value of providing limited exclusivity through IP protection and the importance of promoting competition under the antitrust laws.[15] These cases serve as a check on hold-up power that arises when firms are already “locked in” to using a particular standard. Once an implementer has committed to a standard, there is little it can do to counter an SEP holder’s threat of exclusion. Small implementers that do not have the means to fight an infringement action are particularly vulnerable to hold-up strategies. Antitrust law ensures that the standard-setting process cannot be undermined by deceptive FRAND promises or other strategies that harm competition.

That does not imply that antitrust litigation is the right way to resolve every licensing dispute. Ultimately, antitrust is focused on conduct that harms competition and not high prices or unreasonable royalties alone.[16] Antitrust is not the right tool for licensees who are simply dissatisfied with the rate being offered to them by an SEP holder. While I recognize that licensing negotiations are often contentious and can result in antitrust claims, antitrust law is not a mechanism for powerful, incumbent firms to reduce the royalties they pay to implement standards where competition has not been harmed.

In sum, vigorous competition between technologies to be incorporated into standards is good for the standards ecosystem. Deception about which of these technologies will be licensed on FRAND terms is not. Antitrust enforcement policy should discourage deception and protect competition in the standards-setting process. Therefore, the Antitrust Division intends to adopt a careful, balanced approach here—one that serves competition and consumers, and preserves innovation incentives for both implementers and patent holders.

Promoting Procompetitive SEP Licensing Through Policy Making

The next topic I would like to address is the SEP Remedies Statement. Many of you are aware of this document’s long history, but for those of you who are unfamiliar, let me provide some context. The Division and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) first issued a statement on SEP remedies in 2013. The statement explained the agencies’ joint view that exclusionary relief to remedy infringement of FRAND-encumbered SEPs may harm competition by facilitating patent hold up.[17] The 2013 statement recognized, however, that exclusionary remedies may be in the public interest in some circumstances—for example, when a potential licensee is unwilling to take a license or is not subject to “the jurisdiction of a court that could award damages.”[18] In December 2018, Antitrust Division leadership under the prior administration withdrew support for the 2013 statement, and in December 2019, the agencies, along with National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), issued a new statement.[19] The 2019 statement indicated that no special remedies applied to SEPs, and courts and neutral decision makers should apply the traditional eBay test[20] and other relevant law to determine whether injunctive or exclusionary relief was appropriate. The 2019 statement has been criticized as favoring patent holders and promoting the use of injunctions or ITC exclusion orders to remedy SEP infringement. Although courts review the facts in each case independently, in the wake of eBay, injunctive relief for an SEP subject to a FRAND commitment has rarely been granted.

Consequently, President Biden’s Executive Order on promoting competition asked the agencies to take another look at the SEP Remedies Statement. As I mentioned, we have begun this process, so stay tuned. In my view, no policy statement should favor—or be perceived to favor—particular stakeholders or business interests. Rather it is the Antitrust Division’s goal to provide balanced policy guidance that promotes competition for all participants in the standards ecosystem. Participants in this ecosystem all suffer when individual patent holders or implementers act opportunistically or in bad faith. And consumers bear the brunt of it when such behavior delays the introduction of standardized products or reduces investment in the standards themselves. The Antitrust Division plans to work in partnership with USPTO and NIST and consult with the FTC on how best to respond to the Executive Order’s call for a more procompetitive and balanced policy.

Department Review of SDO Policies

As I mentioned in my opening, it is important that antitrust enforcement policy support SDO policies that address licensing inefficiencies and promote good-faith negotiation. The Antitrust Division supports the development of SDO IPR policies that promote good-faith FRAND licensing negotiation in the U.S. and abroad. SDOs are well situated to provide clarity and resolve some of the bottlenecks in FRAND licensing.

Several SDOs have used the business review process to determine whether the Department likely would challenge a proposed IPR policy change as anticompetitive. For example, the Division issued positive business review letters to VITA in 2006 and to IEEE in 2007 and 2015.[21] Both SDOs amended their IPR policies to include provisions permitting the ex ante disclosure of SEP holders’ most restrictive licensing terms. As regards VITA’s policy change, the Division concluded that it was unlikely to harm competition, and indeed could help to avoid “unreasonable patent licensing terms that might threaten the success of future standards and to avoid disputes over licensing terms that can delay adoption and implementation after standards are set.”[22] When IEEE further defined participants’ licensing obligations in 2015, the Division concluded that revisions to IEEE’s patent policy had “the potential to benefit competition and consumers by facilitating licensing negotiations, mitigating hold up and royalty stacking, and promoting competition among technologies for inclusion in standards.”[23]

We understand that the Division’s 2020 supplemental competition advocacy letter to IEEE questioning the merits of the 2015 business review may have shaken confidence in the business-review process and deterred efforts by SDOs to promote best practices.[24] That is why the Department acted this past April and removed the 2020 supplemental competition advocacy from IEEE’s 2015 review file.[25] We relocated it to our comments and advocacy webpage where we believe it is more appropriately located.

This procedural correction demonstrates the Department’s commitment to preserving the integrity of the business-review process. For those not familiar, since 1968, through this process parties have been seeking guidance about the Antitrust Division’s enforcement intentions with respect to prospective conduct. The Division’s review may indicate whether we intend to bring an enforcement action when the conduct begins, but we also have the discretion to decline to comment or review a particular request.[26]

Given the necessity of collective action to the standard-setting process, it is no surprise that SDOs and other IP joint ventures are repeat customers of the Department’s business-review program.[27] But the program has also been helpful in other contexts. For example, the Division reviewed several collaborations during the course of the pandemic involving coordination among competitors and FEMA to distribute necessary PPE or other critical medicines and supplies needed to treat COVID-19.[28]

A positive business review is a statement that the Division has no present intention to challenge the proposed conduct based on the facts the parties provided. It is not an actual endorsement of the conduct. We make this point expressly in the 2015 IEEE letter[29] and more recently in our review of the Avanci patent pool. The Avanci patent pool proposed to license automakers making connected cars. The Division concluded that the pool was unlikely to harm competition because it incorporated a number of antitrust safeguards and efficiently provided access to thousands of complementary SEPs.[30] We did not endorse, however, the pool’s approach of licensing only automakers or take a position on what licensing method was best for the automotive industry.[31] Rather, the Avanci letter stated explicitly that the Department made “no assessment of whether end-device licensing will be successful in the automotive industry or whether it is the correct approach to licensing in this space.”[32]

The Importance of Transparency

Finally, a few words on transparency. I believe the Division should strive to be transparent about our enforcement priorities in the SEP area. Transparency is important to ensure that firms participating in the standards ecosystem understand the Division’s approach and avoid violating the antitrust laws. Our hope is that this speech and others to come will provide greater transparency into the Division’s policy.

But speeches are not the only vehicle available to us. We promulgate guidance documents, such as the Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property and the SEP Remedies Statement.[33] We also file amicus briefs in the courts of appeal and statements of interest in district courts to provide transparency and to educate the courts on complicated issues of antitrust law. The Division is committed to using all available tools to provide transparency as our policies and the law continue to develop.

Conclusion

An antitrust enforcer’s most important task is to protect competition. We must enforce the law in a balanced and transparent manner. This balance is particularly critical at the intersection of IP, standards development, and antitrust. When we get the balance right, we all benefit. Just look at the world Nikola Tesla imagined—an era of connected smartphones. It depends on a vibrant standards ecosystem. Unlike Tesla, I do not know what technology will define the next era. But I am confident that it will depend on standards. From self-driving cars to the Internet of Things, the world we want to live in will be built by standards. Our policy choices today can make that world possible tomorrow.

 

[1] See Allison Lantero, The War of the Currents: AC vs. DC Power, U.S. Dep’t of Energy (Nov. 2014), https://ift.tt/2vSKDCy.

[2] The Current War “Battle of the Quotes,” Tesla Science Center (Sept. 24, 2021, 11:09AM), https://ift.tt/3A4sxtv.

[3] U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual Property Rights: Promoting Innovation and Competition at 33 (2007), available at https://ift.tt/3amACAe [hereinafter 2007 Antitrust-IP Report].

[4] See Off. of Mgmt. & Budget, Revision of OMB Circular A-119, “Federal Participation in the Development and Use of Voluntary Consensus Standards and in Conformity Assessment Activities” at 2e, 81 F.R. 4673 (Jan. 27, 2016).

[6] Exec. Order No. 14,036, 86 Fed. Reg. 36987 §5d (July 9, 2021).

[7] Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 500 (1988).

[8] 2007 Antitrust-IP Report, supra note 3, Ch. 2, § I.

[9] See, e.g., Statement of Interest of the United States at 1-2, Cont’l Auto. Sys., Inc. v. Avanci, LLC, No. 3:19-CV-02933-M (N.D. Tex. Feb. 27, 2020).

[10] Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 500 (recognizing that standards-development organizations “have traditionally been objects of antitrust scrutiny”).

[11] Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 314 (3d Cir. 2007).

[12] Id. at 313 (citing Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 501).

[13] Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456, 464 (D.C. Cir. 2008).

[14] Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 712 (4th ed. Aug. 2019).

[15] See also Bill Baer, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, International Antitrust Enforcement: Progress Made; Work To Be Done at 8, Remarks at 41st Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy (Sept. 12, 2014), https://ift.tt/2XYMwMO.

[16] United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“From a century of case law on monopolization under § 2 . . . several principles do emerge. First, to be condemned as exclusionary, a monopolist’s act must have an ‘anticompetitive effect.’ That is, it must harm the competitive process and thereby harm consumers. In contrast, harm to one or more competitors will not suffice. ‘The [Sherman Act] directs itself not against conduct which is competitive, even severely so, but against conduct which unfairly tends to destroy competition itself.’”); Rambus, 522 F.3d at 466.

[17] 2007 Antitrust-IP Report, supra note 3, Ch. 2.

[20] eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). (“According to well-established principles of equity, a plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test before a court may grant such relief. A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.”).

[21] Letter from Thomas O. Barnett, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Robert A. Skitol, Esq., Drinker, Biddle & Reath, LLP (Oct. 30, 2006) [hereinafter VITA Letter]; Letter from Thomas O. Barnett, Assistant Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Michael A. Lindsay, Partner, Dorsey & Whitney (Apr. 30, 2007); Letter from Renata B. Hesse, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Michael A. Lindsay, Esq., Partner, Dorsey & Whitney (Feb. 2, 2015) [hereinafter 2015 IEEE Letter].

[22] VITA Letter, supra note 21, at 10.

[23] 2015 IEEE Letter, supra note 21, at 16.

[24] Letter from Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Sophia A. Muirhead, Gen. Counsel & Chief Compliance Officer, IEEE (Sept. 10, 2020).

[25] See Comments to States and Other Organizations, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Sept. 24, 2021, 12:03PM), https://ift.tt/2ZK0Ucz.

[27] See, e.g., Letter from Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Garrard R. Beeney, Partner, Sullivan & Cromwell (Jan. 13, 2021); Letter from Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Mark H. Hamer, Partner, Baker & McKenzie (July 28, 2020) [hereinafter Avanci Letter].

[28] Letter from Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen. of Antitrust, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Sara Y. Razi, Partner, Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP (Jan. 12, 2021); Letter from Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to John G. Chou, Executive Vice President, AmerisourceBergen Corporation (Apr. 20, 2020); Letter from Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Lori A. Schechter et al. (Apr. 4, 2020) ; Letter from Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Thomas O. Barnett, Partner, Covington & Burling (July 23, 2020).

[29] 2015 IEEE Letter, supra note 21. In the 2015 IEEE letter, we said “It is not the Department’s role to assess whether IEEE’s policy choices are right for IEEE as a standards-setting organization (“SSO”). SSOs develop and adjust patent policies to best meet their particular needs. It is unlikely that there is a one-size-fits-all approach for all SSOs, and, indeed, variation among SSOs’ patent policies could be beneficial to the overall standards-setting process. Other SSOs, therefore, may decide to implement patent policies that differ from [the policy change].” We see variation in policies from different national and international SDOs such as ATIS, IEEE, ETSI, VITA and others.

[30] Avanci Letter, supra note 27.

[31] Avanci Letter, supra note 27. (“[T]he Department makes no assessment of whether end-device licensing will be successful in the automotive industry or whether it is the correct approach to licensing in this space . . .We simply opine, based on Avanci’s representations and our review, that Avanci’s approach, which has the potential to aggregate a significant number of cellular SEPs in the marketplace and streamline licensing, is unlikely to harm competition.”).

[32] Avanci Letter, supra note 27, at 21.

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